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Abstract
CACTUSS: Clustering of Attack Tracks using Significant Services
Christopher Thomas Murphy
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Network analysts are bombarded with large amounts of low level data, posing great chal-
lenges for them to differentiate and recognize critical multistage attacks. Multistage attacks
are performed by hackers to compromise one or more machines in a network to gradually
gain access to critical information or network operation hidden behind layers of firewall
rules. These multistage attacks, composed of correlated Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
alerts, can be diverse in the way they progress and penetrate the network. There exists no
current literature defining how these diverse multistage attacks may be classified or cate-
gorized. This work aims to perform unsupervised learning to cluster and identify types of
multistage attacks.
Multistage attacks may attack services of different types, often indicating the behavior
of attack penetration into the network. Divisive Hierarchical Clustering has been shown
to effectively uncover underlying community structure of entities sharing similar features.
This work investigates the use of attacked services as the feature and performs Divisive
Hierarchical Clustering to identify groups of similar multistage attacks. The notion of
social network analysis is leveraged to determine the optimal community structure with
the highest modularity. The resulting clusters and dendrograms provide not only insights
on characterizing multistage attacks, but also a means of reducing the data volume while
enhancing the level of analysis. The outcomes of the proposed methodology are expected
to improve situation awareness in the presence of many diverse multistage attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Network security is becoming more and more important as an ever increasing amount of
data is accessible from the Internet. With this increased accessibility comes more risk, as
more intruders try to gain access to networks with sensitive information. The goal of an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to generate an alert every time there is an unwanted
attempt to access a computer system via a network. An IDS alert usually includes infor-
mation such as the system type, source and target IP address, alert description, network
protocol, and the time of the attack.
There are two different types of intrusion detection approaches that are used to detect
the intrusion alerts: an anomaly based approach and a signature based approach. These
systems, although useful, have a tendency to produce false negatives and false positives,
which correspond to non-detected attacks and false alerts, respectively [9].
Although they contain a lot of data, pure IDS alerts, by themselves, provide very little
in the way of aiding threat identification and mitigation at the network level. A single IDS
alert by itself cannot predict the next event of an ongoing attack, but rather is produced
when malicious attacks on a network are discovered [2]. These low level alerts pose chal-
lenges to any analyst trying to differentiate and recognize multistage attacks. Although IDS
alerts do produce useful information, real-time IDS systems, by themselves, are not nearly
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advanced enough to detect sophisticated multistage network attacks created by “trained
professionals” [3]. In order for more useful analysis to be done, some sort of classification
or correlation will need to be performed first.
One proposed correlation method uses CRIM, “a cooperative module for intrusion de-
tection systems,” which is part of the MIRADOR project researched under the auspices of
the French Defense Agency [9]. This approach reduces the total number of alerts sent to a
network administrator by clustering groups of alerts together, and then merging the alerts
within a cluster to create a new representative alert for each cluster [9]. Since with this
alert merging strategy there are still too many alerts, alert correlation is then performed
to further reduce the number of alerts [9]. This correlation uses automatically generated
correlation rules, which scrutinize the post condition of one alert and the pre condition of
another alert to see if correlation is possible [9].
Another correlation scheme, presented in [18], proposes using a fusion engine to clus-
ter thousands of alerts into 14 classes of multistage attack categories. These attack cate-
gories are Recon Sniffing, Recon Footprinting, Recon Scanning, Recon Enumeration, In-
trusion Root, Intrusion User, Escalation OS, Escalation Service, Goal DOS, Goal Ethical,
Goal Corruption, Goal Espionage, Goal Backdoor, and Goal Pilfering [19].
The attack stage categories of the alerts are then employed to generate multistage attack
tracks of alerts. Using the categories of the alerts, the source IP address, and the destination
IP address of the alerts, it becomes possible to dynamically generate the sequential attack
track of an ongoing attack [19].
1.2 Impact Assessment of the Attack Track
In order to detect these ever more sophisticated attacks, the attacks need to be classified and
correlated to be beneficial to the network analyst. It has therefore been decided to classify
and correlate the sequential multistage attack tracks. For this to be done, the properties
of the attack tracks must be known. Since a singular attack track is nothing more than a
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sequential set of IDS alerts, the properties and attributes of the alerts within an attack track
are the properties and attributes of the attack track itself. Ultimately, the impact assessment
of the attack track will in some way be used to classify and correlate the attack tracks
created by the fusion engine.
Currently, classification is dependent on first correlating individual alerts into sequential
attack tracks, and then either assigning attack tracks to non-scalable attack models [26] or
using machine learning on observed attack tracks [13]. This classification of attack tracks
can allow for a more concrete understanding of group behavior, but unfortunately, there
are no available ground truths, and machine learning may “lead to misleading predictions”
[10]. The answer to these obstacles is to use unsupervised classification. According to
Jain in [16], “Clustering is the unsupervised classification of patterns (observations, data
items, or feature vectors) into groups (clusters).” Clustering will be used to provide the
unsupervised classification of the attack tracks. However, the features of the attack tracks
that will allow the clustering to be performed have yet to be decided. In order for this to be
determined, the nature of the data needs to be analyzed carefully.
1.2.1 Feature Set Selection
Clustering relies on some kind of connections or similarity between the nodes. In this
thesis, similarity between attack tracks will be determined by the impact of the attack track
on the virtual terrain. The thesis of Argauer [2], presents the concept of using a virtual
terrain to accumulate and update all pertinent information regarding a computer network.
The virtual terrain is modeled as a directed graph where hosts, users, and routers are nodes
connected by directed edges, which allows for the calculation of impact assessment [2].
The virtual terrain, which has its attributes defined in Table 1.1, is the terrain on which all
attack tracks attack the network. In Table 1.2, all the entries within an IDS alert are listed.
Collectively, all these properties in Table 1.2 can be considered the potential feature sets of
the attack track.
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Host Router User
A node identifier A node identifier User ID
IP address(es) Router name Account(s) with privilege level
Host name(s) Neighbor Permission List Account criticalities
Machine criticality Allowed (Boolean)
Neighbor list Traffic flow permission list
Allowed (Boolean)
Permission List
Service tree(s)
List of users
Table 1.1: Virtual Terrain Attributes [2]
Alert Properties
Time
Service Exploited
Description
Protocol
Source IP
Destination
Priority
Table 1.2: Properties of an IDS Alert
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One (or perhaps multiple) features from Table 1.2 must be chosen as the metric to per-
form clustering on the attack tracks. For this thesis, the most important features are the
attacked services, which correspond to the service trees of the host nodes. According to
the virtual terrain model described in [2], services are represented as the “service tree(s)”
attribute in Table 1.1. The service tree keeps track of the services, the version of the ser-
vices, and the corresponding IDS alerts to those services for the given host node [2]. The
privilege level of the service attacked on the exploited machines is a good indication of the
privilege level that an attacker has on a compromised machine. If this is to happen, the
attacker is most likely to have access to all the other services and data at the same or lower
privilege level [13].
In addition to this, services are not distributed evenly throughout the network. The ser-
vices throughout a network are setup as needed. Because of this, some “unique” services
are bound to be set up unevenly throughout the network. Also, it may very well be possible
that same or similar services may be susceptible to the same kind of attack [13]. Conse-
quently, clustering attack tracks (sometimes just referred to as “attacks”) by the similarity
of the services that they target has potential to perform classification and correlation needed
by network analysts.
5
Chapter 2
Related Work
As stated in the previous chapter, the classification of the attack tracks is going to be per-
formed by service based clustering. However, a method or series of methods need to be
explored and analyzed to determine the optimal mathematical algorithm to extract the nec-
essary data from the attack tracks so that the clustering can be performed.
According to [16], “Clustering is useful in several exploratory pattern-analysis, group-
ing, decision-making, and machine learning situations, including data mining, document
retrieval, image segmentation, and pattern classification.” As clustering is a type of unsu-
pervised learning and because there are no predetermined categories prior to clustering, it
is ideal for grouping attack tracks into sub-communities. In unsupervised learning, the cat-
egory labels are “data driven,” where the category labels are calculated purely from the data
[16]. At this point, it is necessary to explore several clustering algorithms before choosing
one to cluster the attack tracks. In the clustering taxonomy suggested by [16] in Figure 2.1,
the top level division is between hierarchical and partitional clustering.
Although there are “other taxonomic representations,” [16], this taxonomic representa-
tion is useful in showing the top-level division between hierarchical and partitional clus-
tering. This taxonomic representation also shows the major types of partitional clustering
algorithms.
K-means clustering and graph theoretic clustering are two examples of partitional clus-
tering. K-means clustering works by converting the data into an n-dimensional vector and
6
Figure 2.1: A taxonomy of clustering approaches [16]
then clustering the data into k clusters by their proximity in n dimensional space [16].
Graph theoretic clustering operates by separating the data into k clusters by placing separa-
tions between the clusters where the separations would create the largest distances between
clusters [16]. Partitional clustering algorithms have advantages and disadvantages over the
hierarchical algorithms. The main advantage is that for large data sets, partitional algo-
rithms are less computationally expensive than the hierarchical clustering algorithms [16].
One of the reasons for this is because the number of output clusters is required as an input
to the partitional clustering algorithm [16]. This downside alone is enough to discount all
partitional algorithms, such as squared error algorithms (including k-means clustering) and
graph theoretic clustering, because the number of clusters is not known before the cluster-
ing is performed.
The main feature of hierarchical clustering, the other type of clustering algorithm, is
the production of a dendrogram, which allows for the display of the breakdown of clusters
at any time during the clustering algorithm. The main division in hierarchical clustering
as shown in Figure 2.1 is between single link hierarchical and complete link hierarchical
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clustering. However, in [24], the authors suggest a different division for hierarchical clus-
tering. They suggest there is agglomerative clustering, which depends on the addition of
edges, and also divisive clustering, which depends on the removal of edges. This new top
level division of hierarchical clustering methods has superseded all others, including the
representation in Figure 2.1.
2.1 Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering
In [11], the authors suggest that agglomerative hierarchical clustering can be used to or-
ganize “gene expression of data.” The first step in this process was to find a measure of
similarity between two genes. The genes, in this case, are represented as “n-dimension
vectors, which represented a series of n measurements” [11]. Euclidean distance, angle,
and dot product were considered in the past for the similarity metric, but the dot product
was chosen because it “conformed well to the intuitive biological notion of what it means
for two genes to be coexpressed,” but this method placed no emphasis on the magnitude of
two series of measurements [11].
For this experiment, tables are set-up where the rows were genes and the columns rep-
resented a certain experiment. The values in the table itself are each a fluorescence ratio,
which is then log base 2 transformed [11]. Then, the Pearson correlation coefficient is
used to calculate the similarity between each single pair of genes, which are placed into
an upper-diagonal matrix. From this upper-diagonal matrix, agglomerative hierarchical
clustering can be performed. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Agglomerative hierarchical clustering proposed in [11]
while there is more than one node do
Find the highest similarity value
Find the weighted average of the two corresponding nodes (so we now have one less node)
Recalculate the similarity matrix
end while
A hierarchical tree will show how the nodes are related
8
Figure 2.2: Example of clustering by an agglomerative algorithm where the peripheral nodes, the
light colored dots, were not clustered with the sub-community to which they clearly belong [24]
This process continues until all the nodes have been clustered together into one node.
The dendrogram is produced by drawing an edge on the dendrogram every time a pair of
nodes has the highest similarity. The results of the clustering were positive as genes with
similar functionality were clustered together [11].
Despite its success in [11], agglomerative clustering has two main problems. The
first problem is that the method sometimes fails to find sub-communities when the sub-
communities are known ahead of time [24]. Because of this, Newman and Girvan [24] find
it “difficult to place much trust” in agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithms. The
second problem is that “peripheral nodes that have no strong similarity to others tend to
get neglected, leading to structures as shown in Figure 2.2 [24]. There are a number of
peripheral nodes whose “community membership is obvious to the eye,” but agglomerative
clustering often fails at assigning such nodes to the correct cluster [24]. For these reasons,
divisive hierarchical clustering will now be explored.
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Figure 2.3: Example showing how clusters contain the majority of the edges and have very few
edges in between them [24]
2.2 Divisive Hierarchical Clustering
Social networking and the clustering of a social network into naturally occurring sub-
communities has been well studied [15, 21, 23, 24, 28]. In [24], the authors suggest in-
stead of agglomerative clustering, divisive clustering should be done instead. This means
that instead of adding edges to the graph, edges must be removed from the graph one at a
time to reveal the underlying sub-communities. The goal is to find naturally occurring sub-
communities within the network graph. According to Newman in [23], the vertices within
a network graph will fall naturally into sub-communities. The overwhelming majority of
edges should be present within a sub-community, and ideally, there should be very few
edges between them. An example of this is shown in Figure 2.3.
The questions of how many edges and which order to remove them become important.
Luckily, there is a measurement to calculate the quality of the community structure in a
10
social network graph after any number of edges have been removed. This measurement is
defined in Equation 2.1,
Q =
m∑
s=1
[
ls
L
− ds
2L
2]
[14] (2.1)
where m is the number of sub-communities in the particular partition, ls is the number
of edges within the sub-community, L is the number of edges in the graph, ds is the degree
of the nodes in sub-community s, and a partition is any instance of the social network graph
after edges have been removed.
However, there are countless unique ways to partition a network graph. It is computa-
tionally expensive to mathematically determine the modularity of each and every partition
to determine which is the most effective. According to Newman and Girvan in [24], finding
the perfect partition is believed to be an NP-complete problem. Because of this, an algo-
rithm has been developed to find a partition that may not be the very best, but still performs
quite well in a reasonable amount of time.
The edge removal algorithm is used in conjunction with modularity to find what is
hoped to be the best partition of the original network graph. The essence of this divisive
clustering algorithm is to remove an edge and then check the modularity. This is done
iteratively until the graph has no more edges left to remove.
Determining which edges to remove and what order to remove them is more compli-
cated and more theoretical. The whole concept of modularity is based on the belief that in
the best clustering instance, the majority of edges are found within sub-communities rather
than between them. Consequently, if two separate sub-communities are connected by only
a few edges, the goal of the divisive algorithm is to find these edges and systematically
remove them, leaving natural occurring sub-communities behind [24]. The task is to find
these edges, which are defined by their edge betweenness, the calculation of which is a two
step procedure [24]. The first step in calculating this edge betweenness is the breadth-first
search where the distance between every pair of vertices, and the number of shortest paths
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(the weights) are calculated. The algorithm for the breadth-first search is explained in detail
in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Breadth-first algorithm for edge betweenness [24]
1. The initial vertex s is given distance ds = 0 and a weight ws = 1.
2. Every vertex i adjacent to s is given distance di = ds + 1 = 1, and weight wi = ws = 1.
3. For each vertex j adjacent to one of those vertices i we do one of three things:
(a) If j has not yet been assigned a distance, it is assigned distance dj = di + 1 and weight wj =
wi.
(b) If j has already been assigned a distance and dj = di + 1, then the vertex’s weight is increased
by wi, that is wj = wj + wi.
(c) If j has already been assigned a distance and dj < di + 1, we do nothing.
4. Repeat from step 3 until no vertices remain that have been assigned distances but whose
neighbors do not have assigned distances.
Using these weights and edges in step two, the actual edge betweenness can then be
calculated in reference to every starting path that starts at vertex s. The belief is that most
of these shortest paths or at least a high percentage of them must traverse edges that run
in-between natural sub-communities within a network. This second step is shown in Algo-
rithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Edge betweenness [24]
1. Find every “leaf” vertex t, i.e., a vertex such that no paths from s to other vertices go through
t.
2. For each vertex i neighboring t assign a score to the edge from t to i of wi/wt.
3. Now, starting with the edges that are farthest from the source vertex s. To the edge from vertex
i to vertex j, with j being farther from s than i, assign a score that is 1 plus the sum of the scores
on the neighboring edges immediately below it (i.e., those with which it shares a common vertex),
all multiplied by wi/wj .
4. Repeat step 3 until vertex s has been reached.
There is now an edge betweenness value for every edge in reference to all m vertices
as s, the source vertex. The edge betweenness values are then summed together to find an
overall edge betweenness value for each edge. The edge with the highest edge betweenness
is then removed. The unique part about this algorithm (besides being divisive), which
Newman and Girvan are quick to point out, is the recalculation step [24]. After each edge
removal, the edge betweenness values need to be recalculated. With this recalculation
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included, the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Hierarchical Divisive Clustering [24]
while edges are present do
Remove the edge with the highest betweenness value
Calculate the modularity for the resulting graph
Recalculate the edge-betweenness for all the edges
end while
Graph with highest modularity is the resulting graph
Newman and Girvan explained the need for the recalculation step by using the Zachary
karate club study [24]. The Zachary karate club study social network, which will be ex-
plained in further detail later, is shown in Figure 2.4. Using this network, it is possible to
see the importance of the recalculation step in Algorithm 4, where the resulting dendro-
gram and plot of modularity for the results of clustering are shown with and without the
recalculation step in Figure 2.5. It is not debatable; the recalculation of the edge between-
ness is a necessary step in the algorithm. With this recalculation, Figure 2.5(a) shows a
definitive community structure; there is no community structure in Figure 2.5(b) without
recalculation.
One downside to divisive hierarchical clustering is the length of time it takes to com-
pute the edge betweenness for every edge removal. Finding the edge betweenness for one
removal is done in time O(mn), where m is the number of vertices and n is the number of
edges [24]. Since n edges have to be removed, divisive hierarchical clustering can be run in
time O(mn2) (or O(m3) for a sparse graph) [24]. On the other hand, agglomerative hierar-
chical clustering, which was discussed earlier, runs in time O(m3). It takes time O(m2) to
find the highest similarity, and then this needs to be multiplied bym for allm vertices to get
time O(m3). Since n is significantly larger than m, agglomerative hierarchical clustering
is significantly faster in a standard network.
Now that divisive hierarchical clustering has had its intricacies explained, it is time
to explore actual previous applications of the algorithm. The authors of [22] show how
divisive hierarchical clustering was able to detect sub-communities known ahead of time.
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Figure 2.4: Zachary karate study social network [24].
(a) With Recalculation (b) Without Recalculation
Figure 2.5: Resulting dendrogram and modularity plots with and without edge-betweenness recal-
culation [24]
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In order for already known sub-communities to be detected, the original social network
graph needs to be constructed. This construction is synonymous with the adding of initial
edges to the social network graph.
For the Zachary karate club study, the initial edges were drawn by Newman and Girvan
if Zachary had drawn an edge between the pair in his study [24, 29]. In [29], Zachary came
up with a list of 8 contexts for friendship, all of which were forms of social interaction
outside the karate club. If a pair of students met the criteria for at least one of the eight
contexts, they were considered friends, and an edge was drawn between them in [29]. In
the process of studying the social dynamics of the karate club, the karate club split, with
half of the club following the teacher and half of the club following the administrator.
This split that Zachary studied allowed Newman and Girvan to draw initial edges between
people, and allowed for the testing of the divisive hierarchical clustering algorithm in [24].
Very convincingly, only one node, node 31, was misclassified by the clustering algorithm
[24].
Not all networks will have edges conveniently drawn by others for clustering to be
performed on. In [17], Doubtful Sound bottlenose dolphins of New Zealand were studied.
The interactions between the adult members of the communities were analyzed. A half-
weight index was used to determine if the presence of two dolphins together was more than
95% certain that it was not random; if it was determined the pair spending time together
was not random, an edge was drawn between them on a social network graph [17]. A
picture of this network is shown in Figure 2.6.
In [24], the authors then performed clustering, which created the network that Lusseau
created in Figure 2.6. The network was clustered into four clusters with a modularity of
0.52, which is quite high, in Figure 2.7.
In Figure 2.7, four clusters were found, but if we only look at the two clusters created
from the first split, then the divisive hierarchical clustering algorithm was successful as
the algorithm found two large groups, which were known ahead of time [17]. What is of
15
Figure 2.6: The Bottlenose Dolphin Community [17]
Figure 2.7: Clustered Bottlenose Dolphin Community [24]
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particular interest is the use of a threshold to determine whether or not the pair of dolphins
were friends, which allowed for an initial edge to be drawn between them.
Despite the many positive aspects of hierarchical clustering, the downsides must also
be discussed. This approach, where the highest modularity is the best partition, can present
a minor problem as well. The quality of any partition has no inherent meaning unless it
is compared to the “expected” graph of the exact same size [14]. Specifically, in [14],
Santo Fortunato and Marc Barthlemy show that “modularity contains an intrinsic scale that
depends on the total number of links in the network. Modules that are smaller than this scale
may not be resolved, even in the extreme case where there are complete graphs connected
by single bridges” [14]. This means that the algorithm might not be able to determine if
a single large cluster is indeed a single cluster or rather a group of smaller clusters [14].
A related “problem” to this was seen in the Zachary karate club and the Doubtful Sound
dolphin clustering. Mathematically, the best sub-community found using the algorithm
was a further break down of the real life sub-communities. The modularity equation has no
concept of size or social dynamics; it purely looks edges, vertices, and clusters.
Despite this, modularity is still a good measure of the sub-community quality of the
graph. These embedded smaller clusters can easily be seen through the use of the produced
dendrogram, which is the main product of the divisive hierarchical clustering algorithm.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
The methodology employed in this thesis needs to find sub-communities of attack tracks
based on the services exploited. These sub-communities are to be found using divisive
hierarchical clustering, which was chosen over other forms of clustering. Before divisive
hierarchical clustering can be performed, the attack tracks need to be converted into a
starting social network graph complete with initial edges.
The first issue is how to mathematically model the services exploited by a particular at-
tack. Two potential methods for doing this are to either analyze the order the services were
attacked or to analyze how many time each service was attacked by each attack track (ser-
vice counts). It was decided that because social network graphs can be easily represented
as an adjacency matrix, the group of attack tracks should also be represented as a matrix.
Because of this, service counts were chosen. Looking at the sequences is also relevant as it
is analyzed by Bean in his master’s thesis [4].
Computing the service counts for each attack is trivial and results in a matrix of attack
service counts, the Attack Service Matrix, which is formally defined in the next section.
Part of the methodology involves the design of a series of steps that can convert the attack
service matrix into an adjacency matrix, which can then be converted into a pre-clustering
social network graph. An overview of this methodology with the intermediate steps is
shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Methodology used in this thesis to produce results
3.1 Creating the Attack Service Matrix
The first step is to create the attack service matrix from the actual set of attack tracks. If T
is an attack track, then ti is the ith alert in attack track T , and then x is the number of alerts
in attack track T ,
T = {t1, t2, t3, . . . tx} (3.1)
where the sequential attack track is represented in Equation 3.1. Since in this thesis, the
services attacked by the attack tracks are of interest, the set of potential service targets can
be represented as service array, S,
S = {s1, s2, s3, . . . sn} (3.2)
where n is the number of distinct services. Then, in order to represent services attacked
by an attack track, let R be the attack service array, where ai is the number of visits the
corresponding attack track made to service si, the service count, which is part of service
set S,
R = [a1, a2, a3, . . . an] (3.3)
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where si represents service i and where the number of distinct services is n. Since the
number of attack tracks is m, the attack service arrays can be put together to form the two
dimensional m by n attack service matrix, A.
A =

R1
R2
R3
...
Rm

=

a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 . . . a1,n
a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 . . . a2,n
a3,1 a3,2 a3,n . . . a3,n
...
...
... . . .
...
am,1 am,2 am,n . . . am,n

(3.4)
3.2 Collaborative Filtering and the Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Once the attack service matrix is constructed, the process towards creating the adjacency
matrix begins. In an attack service matrix, the services targeted by an attack track are
represented by an array, and the services targeted by a group of attack tracks are represented
by a matrix. Similarity between attack tracks are calculated by the similarity between the
values of the rows in the attack service matrix. There are a number of intermediate steps
between the attack service matrix and the creation of the adjacency matrix. Attack tracks,
in this thesis, are to be clustered by service based similarity. An example of an attack
service matrix is shown in Table 3.1.
The example attack service matrix shown in Table 3.1 in some ways resembles the
rankings of movies that are given by movie goers. In this comparison, we have movie
goers (or users) instead of attack tracks, and movies instead of services. However, there are
some distinct differences. In Table 3.1, there is a high number of service counts of zero.
A table of movie ranks would also be scaled where perhaps five would be the highest rank
and one would be the lowest rank. There is no scale of values in the example attack service
matrix shown in Table 3.1; the lowest value is zero, and the highest value just happens to
be six. In a table of movie ranks provided by users, the distribution of the data would be
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Attack Track 1 4 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 2 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 5 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 6 4 1 0 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Attack Track 7 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Attack Track 8 2 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Attack Track 9 6 4 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
Attack Track 10 2 1 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 3.1: Example of an Attack Service Matrix
distributed in a bell or Gaussian curve. The distribution of attack service matrix values
from Table 3.1 is shown in Figure 3.2, and is not bell shaped. Instead, the data is heavily
skewed.
If we assume the data in the attack service matrix is bell shaped and evenly distributed,
the Pearson correlation coefficient could be applied. In the case of movie rankings, which
are distributed in a bell shape, collaborative filtering can be used as a recommendation
system that is built on the assumption that others who have liked the same movies as you in
Figure 3.2: Distribution of the values in the Example Attack Service Matrix.
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the past will be able to recommend movies to you in the future [5]. The thinking behind this
logic is that a group of people with similar ranking tendencies will be able to recommend
movies to others within the sub-community. In the case of this thesis, as stated earlier, there
are attack tracks and services instead of people and movies. By using this collaborative
filtering approach to find similar attack tracks, the grouping of attack tracks may be possible
via this method.
The seminal paper on collaborative filtering, [27], introduced GroupLens, which was
one of the first recommendation systems, and it helped Usenet users find articles that would
be interesting to them. GroupLens worked on the simple principle that users who liked the
same articles in the past were likely to enjoy the same articles in the future [27]. GroupLens
had the users rank the articles, and then correlated the ratings to find similar users. A pool
of similar users was then created for each individual user. However, being in one user’s
similarity pool did not guarantee vice versa.
In order to calculate similarity between pairs of users so that the predictions could be
made, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used [27]. This equation is shown in Equation
3.5, where Wi,j is the similarity between users i and j, Ri,k is the ranking given by user i
for movie k and R¯i is the average ranking for user i.
Wi,j =
∑(
Ri,k − R¯i
) (
Rj,k − R¯j
)√∑(
Ri,k − R¯i
)2∑(
Rj,k − R¯j
)2 [5] (3.5)
The number in this similarity pool is generally capped at a certain value. However, the
number of users in this pool does not have to be capped as the preferences of dissimilar
users are negatively weighted, but the idea of caps does introduce the notion that these
caps may limit overlapping. Since the interest here is the groups and not predictions, the
possibility of using discrete groups instead of similarity pools to create the clusters is an
interesting one.
If the data in an attack service matrix was evenly distributed, the Pearson correlation
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coefficient could be applied to create a similarity matrix. However, before the similarity
matrix can be created, the data in the attack service matrix must be in some way modified to
allow for the successful application of the Pearson correlation coefficient so that similarity
values can be calculated.
3.3 Outlier and Residuals
Although the values in the attack service matrix can technically be used to create the val-
ues in the similarity matrix, for reasons discussed above, this cannot be done. Since the
attack tracks are different lengths, different services are targeted with different frequencies,
and the values are all scaled differently, one of the challenges of this thesis is to find a
mathematically sound method for modifying the attack service matrix so that the Pearson
correlation coefficient can be applied.
The obvious approach, applying standard vector normalization to the rows, cannot be
used on the attack service matrix because this will not take into account the skewing of the
attack service counts towards certain services. Because of this, a different approach needs
to be utilized to find the important services for each attack track. Important services in the
attack service matrix are likely to stand out as outliers; finding the outliers in the attack
service matrix would be useful. Given a two dimensional matrix, residuals (that result
from fitting row column averages to the observed entries) can be used to detect outliers in
a two dimensional matrix [1]. For example, within the attack service matrix, the values are
dispersed throughout the matrix non-uniformly. This non-uniformity makes sense as attack
tracks are of different lengths, and different services are attacked with different frequencies.
These outliers can indicate which services are important to which attack tracks.
Residuals can be calculated from a matrix and allow outliers to be easily distinguished
from the non-outliers. The attack service matrix can be classified as a two-way table where
the IDS alerts are classified in two ways (attack track and service), which is why the resid-
uals of the attack service matrix are of interest. The method for finding the residuals is to
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the values in the Example Attack Service Matrix
first find the difference between the observed values in the attack service matrix and the
fitted values, which are calculated from the observed values. Let C be an m by n residual
matrix (same dimensions as the attack service matrix), and A be the attack service matrix
defined earlier in the thesis, then the residuals can be calculated using Equation 3.6 where
Fi,j is the fitted value.
Ci,j = Ai,j − Fi,j[1] (3.6)
Fij = A¯i. + A¯.j − A¯[1] (3.7)
The fitted values used in Equation 3.6 can be calculated using Equation 3.7 where A¯i. is
the mean of the ith row, A¯.j is the mean of the jth column, and A¯ is the mean of the entire
attack-service matrix. Using this formula, it is possible to find the outliers in a matrix, or
in this case, an attack service matrix. The residual value will be positive if it is higher
than expected, negative if is lower than expected, and zero if it is the expected value. The
residual values calculated from the example attack service matrix are shown in Table 3.2.
Now, by looking at Figure 3.3, the distribution of these values is a bell curve where the
distribution of values in Figure 3.2 clearly is not.
Although the values in the residual matrix are not ranks, they do follow a scale. With
24
FTPServer
SMTPServer
POP3Server
HTTPServer
ServiceA
ServiceB
NetBIOSServer
RPCServer
IMAPServer
DNSServer
Telnet
SSH
AIM
SQL
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
1
0.
75
2.
45
1.
45
-0
.6
5
-0
.4
5
-0
.2
5
-0
.5
5
-0
.4
5
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
5
-1
.0
5
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
5
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
2
-2
.7
5
0.
95
-0
.0
5
0.
85
0.
05
0.
25
-0
.0
5
0.
05
0.
25
0.
25
-0
.5
5
0.
25
0.
25
0.
25
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
3
2.
25
-1
.0
5
-0
.0
5
-2
.1
5
0.
05
0.
25
-0
.0
5
0.
05
0.
25
0.
25
-0
.5
5
0.
25
0.
25
0.
25
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
4
-2
.6
1
0.
09
0.
09
-0
.0
1
0.
19
0.
39
0.
09
0.
19
0.
39
0.
39
-0
.4
1
0.
39
0.
39
0.
39
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
5
2.
18
-1
.1
2
-0
.1
2
-1
.2
2
-0
.0
2
0.
18
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
2
0.
18
0.
18
-0
.6
2
0.
18
0.
18
0.
18
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
6
0.
61
-0
.6
9
-0
.6
9
1.
21
-0
.5
9
-0
.3
9
1.
31
1.
41
-0
.3
9
-0
.3
9
-0
.1
9
-0
.3
9
-0
.3
9
-0
.3
9
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
7
-0
.6
1
-0
.9
1
0.
09
-1
.0
1
0.
19
0.
39
0.
09
0.
19
0.
39
0.
39
-0
.4
1
0.
39
0.
39
0.
39
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
8
-0
.8
2
-1
.1
2
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
2
-0
.0
2
0.
18
0.
88
-0
.0
2
0.
18
0.
18
0.
38
0.
18
0.
18
0.
18
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
9
2.
18
1.
88
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
2
-0
.0
2
-0
.8
2
-1
.1
2
-1
.0
2
-0
.8
2
-0
.8
2
3.
38
-0
.8
2
-0
.8
2
-0
.8
2
A
tt
ac
k
Tr
ac
k
10
-1
.1
8
-0
.4
8
-0
.4
8
3.
42
0.
62
-0
.1
8
-0
.4
8
-0
.3
8
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
8
0.
02
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
8
Ta
bl
e
3.
2:
E
xa
m
pl
e
of
a
R
es
id
ua
lM
at
ri
x
25
these “ranks” in the residual matrix, the Pearson correlation coefficient, Equation 3.5, can
now be applied to the values in the residual matrix to find similarity values between pairs
of attack tracks.
3.4 Creating the Social Network Graph
The idea of using similarity values to create discrete groups was discussed earlier. Now that
the values in the residual matrix represent which services are significant for each attack, the
Pearson correlation coefficient can be applied to create a similarity matrix. How are discrete
groups going to be created from the similarity matrix?
Unlike the attack service matrix and the residual matrix, the similarity matrix is anm by
m symmetric matrix that contains the similarity value between every single pair of attack
tracks. The values in the similarity matrix will range between -1.0 and 1.0. A value of 1.0
indicates positive correlation, a value of -1.0 indicates negative correlation, and a value of
0.0 indicates a complete lack of correlation. An example of a similarity matrix produced
by applying the Pearson correlation coefficient to the example residual matrix (Table 3.2)
is shown in Table 3.3.
Which similarity values should result in connections between attack tracks, and which
similarity values should not? The idea is to add a “few” too many edges and then have the
clustering remove the edges to find the underlying sub-communities. Capping the number
of attack tracks that each attack track can be adjacent to is inappropriate because some
attack tracks may be similar to many attack tracks, and some attack tracks may be similar
to very few attack tracks. Reminiscent of the threshold value used to create the dolphin
social network in [17], a threshold value will be used to determine if the similarity value is
high enough to justify the presence of an initial edge, rather than using a cap on the number
of similar attack tracks.
In the social network graph, an attack track is represented by a vertex and the similarities
between attack tracks are represented by the edges. Since divisive hierarchical clustering
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Attack Track 1 1.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.21 -0.00 -0.35 -0.37 -0.76 0.29 -0.36
Attack Track 2 -0.02 1.00 -0.78 0.91 -0.84 -0.20 0.13 0.19 -0.47 0.46
Attack Track 3 0.05 -0.78 1.00 -0.54 0.97 -0.10 0.41 -0.03 0.02 -0.75
Attack Track 4 -0.21 0.91 -0.54 1.00 -0.64 -0.29 0.52 0.48 -0.63 0.24
Attack Track 5 -0.00 -0.84 0.97 -0.64 1.00 0.03 0.30 -0.08 0.01 -0.58
Attack Track 6 -0.35 -0.20 -0.10 -0.29 0.03 1.00 -0.31 0.15 -0.12 0.28
Attack Track 7 -0.37 0.13 0.41 0.52 0.30 -0.31 1.00 0.64 -0.68 -0.39
Attack Track 8 -0.76 0.19 -0.03 0.48 -0.08 0.15 0.64 1.00 -0.49 0.03
Attack Track 9 0.29 -0.47 0.02 -0.63 0.01 -0.12 -0.68 -0.49 1.00 -0.12
Attack Track 10 -0.36 0.46 -0.75 0.24 -0.58 0.28 -0.39 0.03 -0.12 1.00
Table 3.3: Example of a Similarity Matrix
is an edge removal algorithm, it is necessary at this point to insert the initial edges into the
social network graph. The adjacency matrix, G is created by applying the threshold value,
β, to the similarity matrix W . A ’1’ in the adjacency matrix in location Wi,j represents an
edge between attack track i and attack track j, and ’0’ represents the lack of an edge.
Gi,j =
 1 if Wi,j ≥ β0 if Wi,j < β (3.8)
A threshold value of -1.0 indicates that every vertex is connected to every other vertex,
while a threshold value of 1.0 indicates that there are only very few or possibly no initial
edges. Examples of these two unacceptable starting social network graphs are shown in
Figure 3.4.
Based on the images in Figure 3.4, choosing a threshold value is important. A value
somewhere between -1.0 and 1.0 must be chosen. An edge should only be drawn if there
is a similarity between two attack tracks. Although there is an easily determined similarity
value, at what point does the similarity value become similar? The goal is to maximize
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(a) All Separate (b) All Connected
Figure 3.4: On the left, the initial graph produced if the threshold is 1.0, and on the right, the initial
graph if the threshold is -1.0
Figure 3.5: Scatterplot showing number of initial edges and the number of vertices versus a sweep
of threshold values
the connections between the vertices, but at the same time, minimize the number of initial
edges. In order to do this, a sweep of threshold values between 0.0 and 1.0 is used to find
the point where there is the steepest drop off in the number of vertices that are connected
to another vertex. An example plot of this is shown in Figure 3.5.
From this plot, the first drop off that allows the maximum number of connected vertices
but allows for a minimal number of edges is the threshold of 0.27. With a threshold of
0.27, the adjacency matrix shown in Table 3.4 can easily be created. The heuristic used
to determine the threshold value, β, is to simply find the threshold value that allows for
the minimum number of edges while still allowing the maximum number of connected
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Attack Track 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Attack Track 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Attack Track 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Attack Track 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Attack Track 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Attack Track 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Attack Track 7 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Attack Track 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Attack Track 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Attack Track 10 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Table 3.4: Example of a Similarity Matrix
vertices.
With the adjacency matrix shown in Table 3.4, the initial social network graph and the
graph that is produced by the clustering algorithm is shown in Figure 3.6.
As stated before, the defining feature of hierarchical clustering is the resulting dendro-
gram. For the example clustering shown in Figure 3.6, a dendrogram has been produced.
At the top of the dendrogram, all the vertices (attack tracks) are connected, but at the bot-
tom of the dendrogram, all the vertices are separate. As one moves from the top of the
dendrogram to the bottom, the breakdown of the dendrogram shows how the clusters were
broken apart. This dendrogram is shown in Figure 3.7.
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(a) Original (b) Best
Figure 3.6: On the left there is the Original Graph created from 10 example attack tracks, created
with a threshold of 0.27, and on the right, there is the Best Graph with a modularity of 0.405.
Figure 3.7: Dendrogram produced by the clustering shown in Figure 3.6
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Chapter 4
Experiments and Results Analysis
The setup of a physical network, the setup of services on the machines, and the running
of attacks on the network are time consuming to perform. Because of these difficulties,
running attacks on a physical network to generate necessary data is not desirable, and a
simulator will be used to generate the attacks that the clustering will be performed on. For
this thesis, a simulator originally developed by Costantini [8] will be used to generate the
necessary data.
4.1 Simulator
The simulator allows for the creation of tree structure networks made up of routers and
machines. These machines can be either servers, hosts, or generic machines. Furthermore,
the simulator allows the user to customize each machine with a specific set of services.
The routers are also customizable, as IDS sensors can be added and firewall rules can be
set between pairs of routers.
Once the network has been set up, attack scenarios can be designed on the created net-
work. These automated attack scenarios allow the setting of various parameters to choose
exactly how the simulations will run. For instance, the attack scenario generation tool al-
lows the setting of the types of noise, alerts per hour, efficiency, stealth, success, goal,
target, goal type, and the total attack time of the attack [8]. Once the attack scenario has
been created, it can be simulated. The output of a single run of the simulator is an XML
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Figure 4.1: XML representation of an attack tracks and its first alert.
formatted attack track. The output of the simulator, showing an example of an attack track
along with its first alert is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Description of the Network
The constructed network for this thesis has a tree structure that can be effectively divided
into three main parts. There are four external servers (Website, File, Email, and DNS), an
academic subnet, and a financial subnet. A picture of the network used in this thesis is
shown in Figure 4.2. The services that are set on each machine are listed in Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2. From the picture of the network, in Figure 4.2, one can see that the academic
subnet is split into an Art College, an Engineering College, and a Science College. The
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Engineering College is further split into Mechanical, Electrical, and Computer Engineering
Departments. The Science College has been specially set up in such a way so that there
is only one machine for each router, each of which has only one service running. The
financial section of the network is split into Food Service and Bursar’s Office Departments.
Although the network may, in some ways, resemble the RIT Campus Network, it is not
intended on being a factual representation of this network. It is more accurate to describe
the created network as an artificially created network that uses RIT place names. The
different subnets have been specifically setup to highlight different configurations and how
the CACTUSS algorithm responds to different network configurations and setups.
4.3 Data Sets
4.3.1 Data Set sans Noise
The plan of this data set was to only attack the machines in the College of Science because
there is only one machine per router and only one service per machine. The Math Lab,
Physics Lab, Organic Lab, and the Inorganic Lab only have the Microsoft Windows service
on these machines. The Research Server, the Scientific Server, and the Chemistry Server all
have distinct services running. With this setup, the SSH service is running on the Scientific
Server, the XWindows service is running on the Chemistry Server, and the Research Server
has the Apache and the Apache Server services running.
There are four different target machines according to Table 4.3, but the target service at
each of the four machines is the same. The first steps in the attacks are completely random
as the External Web Server, External File Server, External Email Server, and External DNS
Server all have a multitude of services running. After the first steps, the attack progresses
through the specifically designed Science College portion of the network. With this setup,
the first steps are random, the middle steps are dependent on the machine target, and the
final steps are the same. Despite this, because of the high stealth factor, it may appear that
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Figure 4.2: Network used to create the results
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IP Address Machine Services
192.168.1.1 External Website Server ICMP, ColdFusion, PHP, SNMP, UNIX,
WebCGI, Apache Tomcat, Apache
192.168.1.2 External File Server ICMP, NFS, RPC, SNMP,
UNIX, CVS, FTP, Netbios, SSH, TFTP
192.168.1.3 External Email Server ICMP, IMAP, Lotus Server,
POP3, SNMP, SMTP
192.168.1.4 External DNS Server ICMP, DNS
192.168.2.1 Registration Server MS-SQL, ICMP, MySQL, SSH
192.168.2.2 ArtShow ICMP, Apache Tomcat, Apache
192.168.7.1 Art Server ColdFusion, Frontpage98, ICMP,
IMAP, PHP, POP3, SNMP,
WebCGI,Windows, DNS,
Frontpage 98, IIS, FPSE, Quicktime,
SMTP, SSH, TFTP, UPnP
192.168.7.2 ArtLab Windows
192.168.3.1 Engineering Email Server ICMP, IMAP, POP3, SNMP, SMTP
192.168.4.1 ME File Server ICMP, NFS, SNMP, UNIX,
CVS, FTP, Netbios, SSH, TFTP
192.168.4.2 Thermodynamics Lab ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.5.1 EE File Server ICMP, NFS, RPC, SNMP, UNIX,
CVS, FTP, Netbios, SSH, TFTP
192.168.5.2 CEDA Lab ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.5.10 Studio Lab ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.6.1 CE File Server ICMP, NFS, RPC, SNMP, UNIX,
CVS, Netbios, SSH, TFTP
192.168.6.2 VLSI Server ICMP, NFS, RPC, SSH
192.168.6.3 VLSI Lab ICMP, NFS, SSH
192.168.6.11 DCO Lab ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.6.19 Website Server ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.11.1 Research Server Apache, Apache Tomcat
192.168.12.1 Math Lab Windows
192.168.13.1 Scientific Server SSH
192.168.14.1 Physics Lab Windows
192.168.15.1 Chemistry Server X Windows
192.168.16.1 Organic Lab Windows
192.168.14.1 Inorganic Lab Windows
Table 4.1: Services for Each Machine on the Academic Subnet of the Network
35
Machine Services
192.168.8.1 Payroll Server Oracle, Oracle Web App Server
192.168.8.2 Oracle HTTP Server ICMP, NFS, UNIX,
Oracle Web Application Server
192.168.9.1 Food Service File Server ICMP, NFS, RPC, SNMP
UNIX, CVS, FTP, SSH, TFTP
192.168.9.2 RITZ ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.9.8 Crossroads ICMP, NFS, SSH
192.168.9.14 Commons ICMP, XFS, SSH
192.168.10.1 Flex Server ICMP, RPC, SNMP, UNIX, SSH
192.168.10.2 Debit Server ICMP, MS-SQL, SNMP, UNIX, SSH
192.168.10.3 Financial Services ICMP, XFS, UNIX, SSH
192.168.10.9 Payroll Services ICMP, NFS, UNIX, SSH
Table 4.2: Services for Each Machine on the Financial Subnet of the Network
Scenario Attack (Runs) IP Address Type Efficiency Stealth Color
Attack 1(50) - Math Lab 192.168.12.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Blue
Attack 2(50) - Physics Lab 192.168.14.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Green
Attack 3(50) - Organic Lab 192.168.16.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Red
Attack 4(50) - Inorganic Lab 192.168.17.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Yellow
Table 4.3: Description of the Attacks Parameters for the Data Set sans Noise
some of the machines have been “skipped” during the attack, which will directly affect the
clustering results.
4.3.2 Data Set with Noise
After the Data Set sans Noise was created, additional attack tracks were needed to add
noise to the data set. This new data set contains the same 200 efficient attack tracks as
the Data Set sans Noise plus 200 noisy additional attack tracks. The parameters used to
create all 400 attack tracks are shown in Table 4.4. The additional 4 noise scenarios attack
3 targets that were attacked previously by the efficient attacks in addition to one entirely
new target. These four new scenarios have a much lower efficiency value. The results from
this data set were analyzed by themselves and then compared to the data generated without
the noise. The hope is that the algorithm will be able to distinguish between these attack
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Scenario Attack (Runs) IP Address Type Efficiency Stealth Color
Attack 1(50) - Math Lab 192.168.12.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Blue
Attack 2(50) - Physics Lab 192.168.14.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Green
Attack 3(50) - Organic Lab 192.168.16.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Red
Attack 4(50) - Inorganic Lab 192.168.17.1 DoS 1.0 0.9 Yellow
Attack 5(50) - Math Lab 192.168.12.1 DoS 0.4 0.9 Magenta
Attack 6(50) - Physics Lab 192.168.14.1 DoS 0.4 0.9 Gray
Attack 7(50) - Organic Lab 192.168.16.1 DoS 0.4 0.9 Orange
Attack 8(50) - CEDA Lab 192.168.5.2 DoS 0.4 0.9 White
Table 4.4: Description of the Attacks Parameters for the Data Set with Noise
(a) Sans Noise (b) With Noise
Figure 4.3: On the left, the threshold scatter plot for the Data Set sans Noise, and on the right, the
scatter plot but for the Data Set with Noise.
tracks with different paths through the network.
4.4 Generating the Social Network Graph
4.4.1 Threshold Selection
After the generation of the attack tracks specified in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, an appropriate
threshold value needed to be determined for both data sets separately. As explained in
the Methodology Chapter, the threshold value is determined heuristically by looking at the
scatter plots shown in Figure 4.3.
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(a) Original (b) Best
Figure 4.4: On the left there is the Original Graph created from 200 attack tracks of the Data Set sans
Noise created with a threshold of 0.60, and on the right, there is the Best Graph with a modularity
of 0.687
By applying this heuristic to the scatter plots in Figures 4.3, it was determined that for
the Data Set sans Noise, a threshold of 0.59 should be used, and for the Data Set with
Noise, a threshold of 0.60 should be used. With these thresholds, the similarity matrices
can be converted into adjacency matrices and then into the initial social network graph so
that clustering can be performed.
4.4.2 Clustering
With the initial social networks constructed, the clustering can now be performed. The
clustering is an automated procedure, that as described earlier, removes every edge, one
at a time, until the best cluster is detected. The resulting clusters are the products of this
algorithm. In Figure 4.4, there is the clustering performed on the Data Set sans Noise, and
in Figure 4.5, the clustering is performed on the Data Set with Noise. Using this automatic
procedure, the resulting clusters produced from the social network graph have the highest
modularity.
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(a) Original (b) Best
Figure 4.5: On the left there is the Original Graph created from 400 attack tracks of the Data Set with
Noise. created with a threshold of 0.59, and on the right, the Best Graph created with a modularity
of 0.743.
4.4.3 Dendrograms
The clustering results on the two data sets can be visualized as dendrograms. The den-
drograms created from Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 are shown as Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.
These visualizations of the resulting hierarchies shows how the individual clusters are re-
lated to one another. Despite these visualizations of clusters and dendrograms, analysis
needs to be performed to further understand the clustering results.
4.5 Analysis
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the visualizations shown in Figure 4.4, Figure
4.5, Figure 4.6, and Figure 4.7. One immediate observation is that the beginning of the
attack track (the service attacked at the external servers) is a large contributor to which
cluster the attack track is assigned to.
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Figure 4.6: Dendrogram produced from Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.7: Dendrogram produced from Figure 4.5.
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4.5.1 Separation of Attacks with Common Services
The resulting clusters from the Data Set sans Noise, as suspected, show a definitive com-
munity structure. It is now time to analyze the contents of the clusters. Since, the four
targeted machines are in the specially designed Science College section of the network,
there is only a finite number of service sequences for each target machine. The contents
of these clusters, in the forms of their sequences are shown in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6.
From these tables, an analysis of each of the clusters can be made. Although identifying
sequences was not part of this thesis, their identification was a side effect of the specific
setup of the network.
Cluster 1 from the Data Set sans Noise contains all the attack tracks that have targeted
the DNS service. Since this service is found only in the External DNS Server along the
path through the Science College section of the network, all the attack tracks in Cluster 1
have passed through the External DNS Server.
Cluster 3 contains all the attack tracks that contain an attack on the SSH service. Along
the direct path through the College of Science subnet, the SSH service is only running
the External File Server and the Scientific Server. Since no attacks in the entire data set
attacked the SSH service on the External File Server, all the attack tracks that attacked the
SSH service went through the Scientific Server. Since all the attacks in the data set had to
go through the Scientific Server, the contents of Cluster 3 are really the attack tracks that
were detected attacking the Scientific Server.
All the attack tracks in Cluster 2 have attacked the RPC service once, the FTP service
once, and the Apache service twice. In fact, all the tracks that meet this specification except
for those that are clustered in Cluster 3 are found in Cluster 2. The attack tracks in Cluster
2 and Cluster 3 are for the most apart separated by whether or not the attack tracks attacked
the SSH service on the Scientific Server.
Cluster 4 contains all the attack tracks that attacked RPC, TFTP, MySQL, Apache, and
Windows services within a single attack track. Cluster 6 contains the remaining attacks that
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attacked both the RPC service and the TFTP service. The main difference between Cluster
4 and Cluster 6 is whether or not the IDS detected the attacks on the Registration Server
and the Research Server. If the attack on these two machines was detected, the attack was
clustered within Cluster 4; if the attack was not detected, the attack was clustered in Cluster
6.
Cluster 7 contains all the attack tracks that attacked the RPC, FTP, and MySQL ser-
vice. Out of the remaining attack tracks, those which attacked the ColdFusion service were
clustered into Attack Track 8, and those that did not attack the ColdFusion service were
clustered into Cluster 5.
4.5.2 Noise vs. Noiseless Separation
All of the attack tracks analyzed in the previous subsection had a high efficiency value used
to generate the attack tracks. When the attacks with low efficiency value are added (noisy
attacks) to the attacks already made (efficient attacks), the majority of the noisy attacks
are clustered together separately from the efficient attacks. According to Table 4.8, all the
clusters found in Figure 4.4 were found intact in Figure 4.5. Some of the clusters found in
4.4 are sometimes combined with each other, but are ultimately found in Figure 4.5.
The majority of the noisy attacks were, for the most part, clustered independently from
efficient attacks. The 44 attack tracks of Cluster 9 in Figure 4.5 and the 98 attack tracks
of Cluster 11 in Figure 4.5 make up 71% of the total noisy attacks. Another 11 noisy
attack tracks are isolated by themselves, which brings down the number of noisy attack
tracks sharing a cluster with efficient attacks down to less than 25%. This is interesting
because only the noisy attacks that are truly similar to the first 200 efficient attack tracks
get clustered with the efficient attack tracks.
For example, Cluster 2 and Cluster 7 from Figure 4.4 form Cluster 10 from Figure 4.5,
but there are also six “noisy” attacks in Cluster 10. Attack track 203, a noisy attack, follows
the sequence of RPC > FTP > Apache > Apache > Windows, which is just like the
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Cluster Attacks Contents
1 11 5 Red and 6 Yellow
2 2 2 Magenta
3 1 1 Magenta
4 1 1 Magenta
5 1 1 Orange
6 1 1 White
7 1 1 White
8 77 19 Blue, 12 Green, 12 Yellow, 13 Red, 8 Magenta, 2 Gray, 3 Orange, and 6 White
9 44 7 Magenta, 12 Gray, 23 Orange, and 2 White
10 62 31 Blue, 18 Red, 6 Yellow, and 6 Purple
11 98 19 Magenta, 26 Gray, 15 Orange, and 38 White
12 2 1 Gray and 1 Orange
13 2 1 Magenta and 1 Orange
14 41 26 Green, 7 Red, 6 Yellow, 1 Gray, and 1 Orange
15 56 13 Red, 13 Yellow, 12 Green, 6 Magenta, 5 Gray, 5 Orange, and 2 White
Table 4.7: Description of the Resulting Clusters from the Data Set with Noise
Data Set sans Noise - 0.60 Data Set with Noise - 0.59
Cluster 1 Cluster 8
Cluster 2 Cluster 10
Cluster 3 Cluster 14
Cluster 4 Cluster 15
Cluster 5 Cluster 15
Cluster 6 Cluster 1
Cluster 7 Cluster 10
Cluster 8 Cluster 15
Table 4.8: Description of how the different clustering results are related.
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31 attack tracks in Cluster 2, shown in Table 4.5. Another example is Cluster 3 from Figure
4.4, which when joined by two noisy attack tracks, forms Cluster 14 from Figure 4.5.
Attack Track 302, a noisy attack, has a service sequence of RPC > FTP > Apache >
Windows > Apache > Apache > SSH > SSH > XWindows > Windows, which
does not share the sequence, but does not share common services with the attack tracks
in Cluster 3 from Table 4.5. This shows that the CACTUSS approach can successfully
separate efficient attacks from noisy attacks targeting either the same machines or other
machines.
4.5.3 Effects of Network Setup and Attack Types
Now that efficient attacks and noisy attacks have been analyzed, the network setup can be
analyzed. The network itself has a very large impact on the clustering algorithm results.
For instance, the clustering results shown in Figure 4.4 show an initial social network that
is very segregated and does not begin with one large initial cluster. This has to do with the
network setup and the setup of the attack scenarios. All the attacks created in Figure 4.4
are highly efficient, meaning the attack goes directly to the targeted machine. Also, most of
the machines along the path towards the target only had one service running. This created
a situation where there was only one possible direct service path to each target. As a result,
there were a high number of identical attack tracks created. There would have been even
more identical attack tracks created, but a high stealth value was used so some of the steps
of the attack tracks were not detected.
These setup parameters create a situation where the attack tracks are closely related to
a small number of attack tracks, which make up the cluster, and not related to any of the
other attack tracks. As a result of this, the best cluster is the initial cluster. The clustering
algorithm, in this case, does little other than verify that the initial social network was the
best social network graph. If all the attack tracks within a cluster are too similar, the
clustering algorithm will not perform any clustering.
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Although lowering the threshold value will allow for the initial social network graph to
be one contiguous graph in situations like this, this is not advisable. Lowering the thresh-
old value creates extra edges between dissimilar attack tracks, which will make finding
the community structure in a social network graph impossible. This is why choosing the
threshold value at the highest value where all the vertices in the social graph network are
connected to at least one other vertex makes sense. If every vertex is connected to at least
one other vertex, then there must be some underlying community structure that can be de-
tected through the use of clustering or the data set is such that, the clusters have all ready
been detected.
The specially designed network heavily influenced the results, but the stealth parameter
can also influence the results. The stealth parameter for all the attacks created for Figure
4.4 was 0.9, which means that all the attack tracks have a chance of not detecting all the
alerts. By looking at Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, one can see that Cluster 6 and Cluster 7 are
similar except that the attacks in Cluster 7 have attacked the MySQL and Apache services
on the Research Server and the Chemistry Server, but the attacks in Cluster 6 have not
attacked those machines. If the stealth factor had been set lower, the alerts would have been
detected and all the attack track sequences would have been RPC > FTP > MySQL >
Apache > XWindows > Windows, thereby resulting in a single cluster. This just shows
what the CACTUSS algorithm can do; it is able to cluster separately two group of attacks
that are identical with the exception of a few undetected alerts.
4.5.4 Completely Random Data
After the prior results showed the results from highly designed data sets, it is time to look
at results from a “random” data set. The parameters which were used to construct this data
set are shown in Table 4.9. There was a total of 20 scenarios run, each five times, for a total
of 100 attack tracks.
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Scenario Attack (Runs) IP Address Type Efficiency Stealth
Attack 1(5) - Math Lab 192.168.12.1 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 2(5) - Physics Lab 192.168.14.1 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 3(5) - Organic Lab 192.168.16.1 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 4(5) - Inorganic Lab 192.168.17.1 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 5(5) - Math Lab 192.168.12.1 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 6(5) - Physics Lab 192.168.14.1 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 7(5) - Organic Lab 192.168.16.1 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 8(5) - CEDA Lab 192.168.5.2 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 9(5) - CEDA Lab 192.168.5.2 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 10(5) - CEDA Lab 192.168.5.2 DoS 0.4 0.1
Attack 11(5) - CEDA Lab 192.168.5.2 DoS 1.0 0.1
Attack 12(5) - RITZ 192.168.9.2 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 13(5) - Flex Server 192.168.10.1 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 14(5) - Debit Server 192.168.10.2 DoS 1.0 0.1
Attack 15(5) - Art Server 192.168.7.1 DoS 1.0 0.9
Attack 16(5) - VLSI Server 192.168.6.2 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 17(5) - CE File Server 192.168.6.1 DoS 1.0 0.1
Attack 18(5) - Engineering Email Server 192.168.3.1 DoS 0.4 0.9
Attack 19(5) - Registration Server 192.168.2.1 DoS 1.0 0.1
Attack 20(5) - External DNS Server 192.168.1.4 DoS 1.0 0.9
Table 4.9: Description of the Attacks Parameters of the Random Data
48
Figure 4.8: Scatter plot used to determine the threshold value of 0.52 for the Random Data Set
Cluster Attacks
Cluster 1 4,18,26,30,35,39,48,59,60,61,62,71,74,76,81,82,84,86,89,94,97,99
Cluster 2 2,5,9,12,15,20,23,24,25,28,37,40,47,55,64,66,69,83,85,91,92,93,96,98,100
Cluster 3 36,42,45,49,50,51,52,56,57,58,63,65,67,68,70,80,87,88,90,95
Cluster 4 27,31,34,46,77
Cluster 5 43,53
Cluster 6 1,3,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,16,17,19,21,22,29,32,33,38,54,72,78,79
Cluster 7 41,44,73,75
Table 4.10: Description of the Resulting Clusters from the Random Data Set
The social network graph for this network was created the same way by first deter-
mining the threshold and then analyzing the resulting clusters. The scatter plot, shown in
Figure 4.8, was used to determine the threshold value of 0.52.
The threshold value was used to determine an adjacency matrix, which was then, in turn,
used to create the social network graph. The resulting network graph and the clustered
network graph are shown in Figure 4.9. The contents of the clusters are shown in Table
4.10. Since there are five attack tracks created for every scenario, the mapping of Attack
Track to Scenario can be explained by Equation 4.1.
AttackScenario = b(AttackTrack − 1)/5c+ 1 (4.1)
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(a) Original (b) Best
Figure 4.9: On the left there is the Original Graph created from 100 attack tracks of the Random
Data Set created with a threshold of 0.52, and on the right, there is the Best Graph with a modularity
of 0.695.
Even if attack tracks were created by the same attack scenario in the simulator, there is
no guarantee that attack tracks created from the same scenario will be clustered together.
Equation 4.1 shows a useful tool in analyzing the attack tracks, but it shows nothing defini-
tive.
It is time to analyze the clustering results from the random data set. Cluster 7 has four
attack tracks: two of which originated from Scenario 9 and the other two attack tracks
originated from Scenario 15. All four attack tracks follow the service sequence of RPC >
FTP > Apache > XFS/ColdFusion. Cluster 5, with only 2 attack tracks, contains
every attack which attacks both the Apache Tomcat and XFS service. Cluster 2 includes
all the attack tracks that attacked the DNS service twice. Cluster 3 has 20 attack tracks, 19
of which attacked the SMTP service and 17 attack tracks that attacked the IMAP service,
which are both email protocols. The majority of the attack tracks in Cluster 1 attacked both
RPC and FTP services. Also, all but one of the attack tracks that attacked the Oracle Web
Application Server are found in Cluster 1. All five attack tracks in Cluster 4 have attacked
the Windows service. The last cluster, Cluster 6, contains a number of attack tracks, all of
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which have attacked the Apache service multiple times. The resulting dendrogram from
the Random Data Set is shown in Figure 4.10.
4.5.5 Dendrogram: Good vs. Bad Clusters
The dendrograms produced by the Random Data Set are ideal for analyzing dendrograms.
Just by looking at the resulting dendrogram in Figure 4.10, it is possible to determine if
the resulting cluster is a good one. Within a cluster, there should be a “staircase” and
between clusters, there should be a “tournament tree.” Close ups of the “staircase” and the
“tournament tree” are shown in Figure 4.11. The clustering algorithm tries to split a cluster
in two by removing the edge.
This tournament tree, arises from when edge removals result in cluster splits, mean-
ing that the separated clusters are distinct. Specifically, this separation occurs when there
are multiple sub-communities within a cluster. The reason for the two different kinds of
breakdowns is simple. The second kind, a staircase, appears when the clustering algorithm
removes one attack track at a time from the cluster instead of splitting the cluster because
clustering is unable to split the cluster. When a large number of individual attack tracks
begin to be removed from the cluster, the best cluster has probably already been identified.
The appearance of a dendrogram can show how effective the clustering is.
4.5.6 Alternate Similarity Metric: Longest Common Subsequence
So far, similarity between attack tracks has been calculated by applying the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient to the residual values of the attack service matrix. However, different
methods for generating similarity between attacks are possible. One possibility is the use
of the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) algorithm in place of the current similarity al-
gorithm. The LCS algorithm, as used in [4], produces four similarity matrices because [4]
uses four feature sets. The CACTUSS algorithm only deals with a single similarity matrix,
and as a result, this “replacement” cannot be used directly. Specifically, in [4], services,
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Figure 4.10: Dendrogram produced from the Random Data Set.
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(a) Staircase
(b) Tournament Tree
Figure 4.11: Staircase and the Tournament Tree dendrogram connections
severity (category), destination IP address, and protocol are used as the four feature sets
in the LCS algorithm. Bean’s research has discouraged the use of the protocol attribute
because it is the least interesting characteristic out of the four [4].
In this extension of the CACTUSS algorithm, only subsequences of services, severity,
and destination IP address will be used. Since there are three similarity matrices, a thresh-
old value will need to be found for each similarity matrix separately. For this experiment,
the data set created in Table 4.4 (the Data Set with Noise) was used so that reasonable com-
parisons and analysis can be made. Coincidentally, the threshold value for each of the three
similarity matrices was found to be 0.75. The scatter plots used to determine the thresholds
are shown in Figure 4.12.
The results of this clustering are different than the results of the previous experiments.
There were a total of 104 distinct clusters produced from a total of 400 attack tracks.
Seventy-four of these clusters only contained a single attack track. Twelve more clus-
ters contained only two attack tracks, and two more clusters contained exactly three attack
tracks. This leaves the remaining 296 attacks tracks to be divided among 16 clusters. This
information is tabulated in Table 4.11. The original and best social network graph are
shown in Figure 4.12. A “representative” attack track is shown for each cluster in Table
4.12 and Table 4.13.
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(a) Services (b) Severity
(c) Destination
Figure 4.12: Threshold scatter plots created from the LCS similarity matrices.
Tracks in Cluster Number of Number of Tracks Attack Tracks
Clusters Represented
1 Track 74 74 6,8,9,11,12,14,15,16,17,19,21,22,25,
26,27,28,29,32,33,34,35,37,38,39,40,
41,42,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,
54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,
66,67,68,69,71,73,74,77,78,79,80,81,
82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,92,93,94,95
2 Tracks 12 24 7,20,23,24,30,31,36,43,70,72,75,76
3 Tracks 3 6 10,91
More than 3 Tracks 15 296 1,2,3,4,5,18,96,97,98,
99,100,101,102,103,104
Table 4.11: Description of the Clustering based on the LCS Similarities
54
(a) Original (b) Best
Figure 4.13: On the left there is the Original Graph created from LCS Data, and on the right, there
is the Best Graph
By looking at Table 4.12 and Table 4.13, we can see the sequence of exploited services,
the sequence of severities, and the sequence of destination IP addresses. The “represen-
tative” attack track for each cluster does not guarantee that each attack track within the
cluster is identical, but does show a good representation of the cluster.
By comparing the pre-clustering groups and the post-clustering groups, some observa-
tions can be made. Before the clustering was performed, the attacks in clusters 96 through
104, were initially one large cluster. These 9 clusters contain 234 attack tracks and were
separated by the clustering algorithm. Clusters 1 through 5 contain 49 attack tracks. The
interesting thing about these attack tracks is that every attack track within each Cluster 1
through 5 are identical and were all attacks from Table 4.4. Because of these facts, it is
not surprising that these clusters were grouped together prior to the clustering. Clusters 6
through 95, were all generally small (1, 2, or 3 attacks each), and every attack that com-
poses clusters 6 through 95 was a noisy attack. Clusters 96 through 104, which originated
as one cluster, contain both efficient and noisy attack tracks from Table 4.4.
The clustering algorithm was only performed on the attack tracks in cluster 96 through
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104. Coincidentally, these are the only clusters that contain both efficient and noisy attacks.
Although there are similarities between clusters in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, the clusters
were not intact. This is not surprising as two different similarity metrics were used. How-
ever, the clustering results from both data sets was logical.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The main contribution of this thesis was showing that clustering is a valuable tool in the
analysis of attack tracks. In order to perform the clustering, divisive hierarchical clustering
was chosen over other unsupervised learning methods. The divisive hierarchical clustering
method was able to (along with the other components of the CACTUSS algorithm) effec-
tively find the sub-communities of attack tracks and identify the underlying community
structure based solely on the service counts of each attack track.
Using the CACTUSS algorithm, clustering was able to successfully cluster efficient
attack tracks on the attacked services using a specially designed network. These clusters
were tightly connected, and clustering was not required to separate the clusters. With the
addition of the noisy attacks, the efficient attack clusters were still found in the social
network graph. The efficient attacks were “cores” of these clusters with similar noisy
attacks slightly less connected. The majority of the noisy attacks, however, were clustered
separately from the efficient attacks. It is important to recognize from the results that the
setup of the attacks, the stealthiness of the attacks, and the services running on the machines
all directly affected the created attack tracks and therefore the resulting clusters. With
these results from specifically designed data, it became necessary to view the results from
“random data.” The results from the random data were similar to that of the specifically
59
designed data; there was a community structure in the attack tracks.
For each of the clustering results, a dendrogram was produced. This resulting den-
drogram showed how the different clusters were related and how the attack tracks within
a cluster were related. This outlook gives an accurate representation of the hierarchical
relationship within the clusters.
The creation of clusters using other similarity metrics was also explored. In particular,
similarity values produced by Bean’s LCS algorithm [4] were used to create the initial
social network graph. Although community structure was found, there was a high number
of clusters with only one attack track. More research is needed to explain why this is.
Specifically, the hope of this combined work is to more accurately predict the capability of
attack tracks.
5.2 Future Work
The use of Bean’s algorithm leads into the use of other feature sets. The feature set used
to cluster in this thesis are the counts of the attacked services. One potential choice of
future work would be to replace or to enhance the feature set chosen for clustering. Source
and destination IP addresses, protocol, category of the alert, time of the attack, and other
potential features all hold the possibility of being used in place of using services. The use
of multiple edge graphs or the requirement of not requiring all similarity matrix values to
be above the threshold values is being explored in an upcoming journal paper.
Currently, there is also an improved and more robust network simulator being devel-
oped. One of the first steps towards any future work would be to utilize this new simulator
with the current CACTUSS algorithm. This will allow more complicated networks to be
designed and more sophisticated attacks to be simulated to generate entirely new sets of
data. With these new data sets being created, more insight into the inner working of the
CACTUSS algorithm will be gained. With this insight, it is likely that improvements to
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the algorithm can be made. One improvement, which could be made with more mathemat-
ical research, is the further formalization of the calculation of the threshold value used to
create the adjacency matrix from the similarity matrix. Since the current method is only
a heuristic, having a more concrete mathematical equation to determine a threshold would
be preferred.
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